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Abstract
Ownership structure, among other things, is one mechanism in corporate gover-
nance. In this context, ownership has a monitoring function. Another corporate
governance mechanism is the market for corporate control. If managers did not
act in the best interest of shareholder, then firm performance will decrease. The
decreasing of firm performance will be followed by the changing in ownership.
This will raise an interesting question, whether ownership caused by firm perfor-
mance or vice versa. The objectives of this study to test whether monitoring func-
tion or market for corporate control that was implement as a corporate gover-
nance mechanism in Indonesia using causality model. A panel Granger-causal-
ity test base on Ganger (1969) applied to test the causality. Samples in this study
were manufacture listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012-
2016. Ownership concentration was proxy by the Herfindahl Index of Domestic
Institution ownership. The firm performance indicators in this study were effi-
ciency, measured by Operating cost to Sales ratio, and Sales to Asset ratio and
Tobin’s Q. The results of the study showed that there was a bi-causality relation-
ship between ownership concentration and both firm performance indicators.
These suggested that the monitoring function and the market for corporate con-
trol were implemented as a corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia.
Keywords: Causality; Corporate Governance; Firm Performance; Ownership
Structure
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G23
Citation: Gunarsih, T., Setiyono, Sayekti, F., & Novak, T. (2018). Good corporate gov-
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Abstrak
Struktur kepemilikan, diantara yang lain, merupakan salah satu mekanisme tata kelola
Dalam konteks ini, kepemilikan memiliki fungsi monitoring. Mekanisme tata kelola lainnya
adalah pasar untuk pengendalian perusahaan. Jika manajer tidak bertindak untuk
kepentingan terbaik pemegang saham, maka kinerja perusahaan akan menurun. Penurunan
kinerja perusahaan akan diikuti oleh perubahan kepemilikan. Hal ini  menimbulkan
pertanyaan yang menarik, apakah kepemilikan disebabkan oleh kinerja perusahaan atau
sebaliknya. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji apakah fungsi monitoring
atau pasar untuk pengendalian perusahaan sebagai mekanisme tata kelola di Indonesia
menggunakan model kausalitas. Uji kausalitas Granger mendasarkan pada Ganger (1969)
digunakan untuk menguji kausalitas. Sampel dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan
manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama tahun 2012-2016. Konsentrasi
kepemilikan diproksikan oleh Herfindahl Indeks Kepemilikan Domestik. Indikator kinerja
perusahaan dalam penelitian ini adalah efisiensi, diukur dengan rasio Biaya operasi terhadap
Penjualan, dan rasio Penjualan terhadap Aset dan Tobin Q. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan
bahwa terdapat hubungan bi-causality antara konsentrasi kepemilikan dan kedua indikator
kinerja perusahaan. Ini menunjukkan bahwa fungsi pemantauan dan pasar untuk kontrol
perusahaan dilaksanakan sebagai mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan di Indonesia.
Kata Kunci: Causality; Tata Kelola; Kinerja Perusahaan; Struktur Kepemilikan
 
This is an open access
article under the CC–BY-SA license
Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test
Tri Gunarsih, Setiyono, Fran Sayekti, & Tamas Novak
| 671 |
Corporate governance issues arise because of the
separation between ownership and control (Berle
& Means, 1934). Ownership represents the owner/
shareholder while control conducted by managers.
Since managers involve in the day to day operation
of the company, then they have more information
than the owners (asymmetric information). They
may engage in self-serving behavior. That is, they
make decisions that will benefit them at the expense
of the owner. Corporate governance then needed
to align the interest of owner and managers. The
key elements of corporate governance are a con-
cern with the enhancement of corporate performance
via the supervision, or monitoring, of management
performance and ensuring the accountability of
management to shareholders and another stake-
holder base on the regulatory framework (Keasey
& Wright, 1997).
One of the corporate governance mechanisms
that can be used to align managers’ and owners’
interest is ownership concentration (Denis, Denis,
& Sarin, 1999; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). This concen-
tration may serve to limit managerial discretion or
to align managers’ and owners’ interest. By con-
centrating ownership, shareholders have the incen-
tive to monitor managers, so they act in the best
interest of shareholder. Empirical studies support
this argument Cabeza-Gracia & Gómez-Ansón (2011)
and Villegas-Guerrero et al. (2018). Cabeza-Gracia
& Gómez-Ansón (2011) found that after controlling
for endogeneity (the method of privatization, the
type of industry, the company’s size and its level of
risk), ownership concentrated in the hands of pri-
vate investors have a positive and significant effect
on post-privatization efficiency. Villegas-Guerrero
et al. (2018) analyzed to what extent the impact that
different levels of ownership concentration have on
performance could be aûected by the roles per-
formed by board members. The results of their study
showed that the monitoring provided by the board
positively inûuences the eûect that ownership con-
centration has on performance.
Majority ownership has high incentives and
monitoring capabilities because majority owners can
control the Board of Directors (Gedajlovic &
Shapiro, 1998). Ownership structure, then, among
other things, is one mechanism in corporate gover-
nance. In this context, ownership has a monitoring
function.
Another corporate governance mechanism is
the market for corporate control (Walsh & Seward
1990). If managers do not act in the best interest of
shareholder, then firm performance will decrease.
The decreasing of firm performance will be followed
by ownership changing. The market for corporate
control consists of all mergers, acquisitions, and re-
organizations including those by a competitor, a
conglomerate, or a private equity buyer (Larcker &
Tayan, 2015).
This study develops a causality model to test
whether internal mechanism of governance through
monitoring function or market for corporate con-
trol (external mechanism) that were implemented
as a corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia
or both of them. This study will give a contribution
to ownership and firm performance relationship, in
term of agency problem and market for corporate
control.
Most studies in Indonesia analyzed corporate
governance as an internal mechanism (Sumarno,
Widjaja, & Subandriah, 2016; Andriana & Panggabean,
2017; Mulyono, Suprapto, & Prihandoko, 2018), then
this study will give empirical evidence whether in-
ternal, external, or both mechanism that was imple-
mented as a corporate governance mechanism in
Indonesia using causality test. The causality test may
predict causality between ownership and firm per-
formance, whether ownership is causing firm per-
formance, firm performance is causing ownership
or both event, there is said to be a feedback rela-
tionship between ownership and firm performance.
Internal and external mechanism of corporate
governance gives different consequences of owner-
ship structure and firm performance. In the internal
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mechanism, ownership concentration can be used
to align managers’ and owners’ interest. This sug-
gests that ownership influences firm performance.
In the external mechanism, if managers do not act
in the best interest of shareholder, then firm per-
formance will decrease. The decreasing of firm per-
formance will be followed by ownership changing,
through mergers or acquisition. This suggests that
firm performance influences ownership. Those will
raise an interesting question, whether ownership is
caused by firm performance or vice versa.
Some studies by Al-Haddad, Alzurqan, & Al-
Sufy (2011), Sumarno, Widjaja, & Subandriah, (2016),
Andriana & Panggabean (2017), and Mulyono,
Suprapto, & Prihandoko (2018), support the argu-
ment that better corporate governance tends to have
better performance, then there is a positive relation-
ship between corporate governance and firm per-
formance. Theoritically, Khan (2011) explained that
corporate governance also enhances the long-term
shareholder value by the process of accountability
of managers and by enhances the firm’s perfor-
mance. It also eliminates the conflict of ownership
and control by separately defines the interest of
shareholders and managers.
Al-Haddad, Alzurqan, & Al-Sufy (2011) found
a positive direct relationship between corporate
governance and corporate performance. Other stud-
ies in corporate governance using index (CGPI-Cor-
porate Governance Perception Index) and stock re-
turn, conducted by Mulyono, Suprapto, &
Prihandoko (2018). They found that corporate gov-
ernance, among other variables, influenced stock
prices. Sumarno, Widjaja, & Subandriah (2016) stud-
ied the implementation of Good Corporate Gover-
nance principles (based on OECD principles) in In-
donesia to profitability and firm value and found
that there was a positive and significant impact.
Andriana & Panggabean (2017) using manufactur-
ing companies listed in IDX found that GCG mecha-
nisms (managerial ownership, institutional owner-
ship, the proportion of independent commissioners)
had a significant effect on financial performance
(ROE).
The results of the studies in corporate gover-
nance and corporate performance are mixed. Some
support the argument of a positive relationship, as
mentioned before, but some are mixed (Bhagat &
Bolton, 2008; Danoshana & Ravivathani, 2013;
Marashdeh, 2014; Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017) and some
do not support (Heracleous, 2001; Makki, Abdul, &
Lodhi, 2013; Basyith, 2016).
Bhagat & Bolton (2008) find that better gov-
ernance as measured by Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick
(2003) index and Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009)
index, stock ownership of board members and CEO-
Chair separation is significantly positively correlated
with better contemporaneous and subsequent op-
erating performance. But, board independence is
negatively correlated with the better contempora-
neous and subsequent operating performance.
Dzingai & Fakoya (2017) examined the effect of cor-
porate governance structures on firm financial per-
formance using secondary data from the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The results in-
dicated there was a weak negative correlation be-
tween ROE and board size, and a weak, but posi-
tive, a correlation between ROE and board inde-
pendence. Additionally, there is a positive, but weak,
correlation between ROE and sales growth, but a
negative and weak relationship between ROE and
ûrm size. The study suggests that effective corpo-
rate governance through a small effective board and
monitoring by an independent board result in in-
creased firm financial performance.
Corporate governance can be highly influen-
tial to organizational performance in so far as it is
related to the strategic management of corporations.
Marashdeh (2014) examined the effect of corporate
governance on firm performance in Jordan. The
empirical evidence reveals a mixed of results. The
findings fail to reveal any significant impact on the
board size on firm performance. However, CEO
duality tends to have a positive effect on the firm
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performance, which indicates that the Jordanian
firms perform better if the chairman and the CEO
roles are combined in a single individual. It was also
found that Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) have a
negative impact on firm performance, which is in-
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis of agency
theory, which holds that the NEDs play an impor-
tant role in the board as a source of experience,
monitoring services, reputation and expert knowl-
edge with the likelihood to improve firm perfor-
mance. Furthermore, the findings report positive
and negative impacts of managerial ownership and
ownership concentration on firm performance (re-
spectively). Finally, the findings reveal a positive
relationship between foreign ownership and firm
performance.
Another study in Sri Lanka conducted by
Danoshana & Ravivathani (2013). They found that
variables of corporate governance significantly im-
pact on firm’s performance and board size and au-
dit committee size have a positive impact on firm’s
performance. However, meeting frequency has a
negative impact on a firm’s performance. Those stud-
ies in ownership and firm performance suggest that
performance is a function of ownership.
While the study of Heracleous (2001) found
that CG best practices are irrelevant to performance,
furthermore, Heracleous (2001) explained that there
is a possibility that different types of organizations
require different practices in corporate governance.
Basyith (2016) studied in Indonesian-listed compa-
nies and found that corporate governance variables
(commissioners, directors, education, and capital
employed efficiency) had no impact on firm perfor-
mance (Tobin’s Q). In the Karachi Stock Exchange,
Makki, Abdul, & Lodhi (2013) developed a model
linking corporate governance, and financial perfor-
mance then verifies it through structural equation
modeling based on partial least square. The study
concludes that corporate governance does not im-
prove financial performance consistently. Rather it
proposes that corporate governance can enhance it
significantly through exploiting intangible resources.
In the market for corporate control, the price
of a stock reflects not only the value of corporate
assets but also the performance of management in
realizing that value (Larcker & Tayan, 2015). Then
the board of an underperforming company has the
choice to replace management or sell the entire com-
pany to new owners who can manage its assets more
profitability. According to Jensen & Ruback (1983),
stockholders have no loyalty to incumbent manag-
ers. They simply choose the highest dollar value
offer from those presented to them in a well-func-
tioning market for corporate control, including sale
at the market price to anonymous arbitrageurs and
takeover specialists. Takeovers can occur through
merger, tender offer, or proxy contest, and some-
times elements of all three are involved.
Traditional perspective on the market for cor-
porate control is that it constitutes an essential com-
ponent in external corporate governance mecha-
nisms. If a firm does not perform well or cater to
shareholders’ interests, it will simply become a take-
over target, and the incompetent incumbent man-
agement will be replaced with a more efficient team
of new managers (Manne, 1965). Agency problem
arises when management acts for their benefit at
the expense of shareholders. In the market for cor-
porate control, if the firm performance decreases,
then there is an opportunity to be taken over and
there will changing in ownership. The studies in the
market for corporate control by Manne (1965),
Jensen & Ruback (1983), and Larcker & Tayan (2015)
suggest that ownership is a function of performance.
METHODS
Samples in this study are public companies,
listed in IDX. The samples are selected using pur-
posive sampling method, based on the following
criteria: (1) manufacturing companies, listed in the
IDX from 2012-2016 ; (2) the financial statement data
are available for the reporting year 2012-2016. Both
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criteria are needed to compute ownership and also
firm performance; and (3) the sample firms publish
audited financial statements using reporting period
ended on December 31st.
Ownership structures in this study are insti-
tutional ownership proportion by the domestic in-
stitution. This is because IDX is characterized, among
other things, by the domination of large sharehold-
ers, especially domestic institutions, then a large
proportion of domestic institution ownership will
have an impact on performance. Proportion owner-
ship by domestic institutions used to measure own-
ership concentration using Herfindahl Index
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Claessens, 1997; Gunarsih,
2003). Herfindahl Index Domestic Institution
(HI_DOM) is the sum of a square from proportion
by the domestic institution, compute using the fol-
lowing formula.
performance’s measurement is an indicator of a
firm’s prospect, indicates that the higher the Tobin’s
Q, the more attractive the firm. Tobin’s Q computed
using the following formula:
ܪܫ_ܦܱܯ =  ∑ (ܲݎ݋݌݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ ݋݂ ܦܫ݅2)݊݅=1
݊
 (1)
Where:
HI_DOM = Herfindahl index of a domes-
tic institution
Proportion of DIi = Ownership proportion by a do-
mestic institution
n = Number of a domestic institu-
tion
Efficiency as firm performance’s proxy, mea-
sured by operating cost to sales ratio or O/S, and
sales to assets ratio or S/A. There are two reasons
why O/ S and S/ A are used as a proxy for firm
performance. First, O/ S and S/ A are proxies of
short-term oriented behavior (Gedajlovic & Shapiro,
1998). Second, both ratios are proxies of agency cost
(Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). Tobin’s Q as market firm
ܶܳ =  ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ݋݂ ݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ +  ܾ݋݋݇ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ݋݂ ܾ݀݁ݐ
ܤ݋݋݇ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ݋݂ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐ  (2)
Where:
Market value of equity = stock outstanding x
closing price
Book value of debt = book value of debt at
the end of the fiscal year
Book value of total asset = book value of total asset
at the end of the fiscal
year
Unit root test Dickey and Fuller is implemen-
ted to test the stationarity. Variable Xt is tested using
this equation (Thomas, 1997).
Xt = a + * Xt-1 + ut (3)
The coefficient of * is estimated base on equa-
tion (3). The nonstationarity is not accepted (F*=0)
if F* estimated is statistically negative significant.
A panel Granger-causality test base on
Granger (1969), will be conducted to test the cau-
sality, using two equations:
ܺݐ = ∑ ݆ܽ ܺݐ−݆ + ∑ ܾ݆ ܻݐ−݆  ݆݊=1 +∈ݐ݆݊=1
ܻݐ = ∑ ݆ܿ ܺݐ−݆ + ∑ ݆݀ ܻݐ−݆  ݆݊=1 +∈ݐ݆݊=1 . (4)(5)
The definition of causality given by equation
(4) and (5), implies that Yt is causing Xt provided
some bj is not zero. Similarly, Xt is causing Yt if some
cj is not zero. If both of the events occur, there is
said to be a feedback relationship between Xt and
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Yt. X is firm performance, using efficiency and also
Tobin’s Q while Y is stock ownership represented
by Herfindahl Index. According to Erdil & Yetkiner
(2004), the literature generally does not provide
diversified methods for Granger (1969) causality
tests in panel data models.
RESULTS
This section describes the results and discus-
sion. The first part result, consist of descriptive sta-
tistics and the causality test. Before the causality
between the two variables was tested, a stationarity
test and then the co-integration test were conducted
first. The second part is a discussion.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. The
model consists of 718 observations. The mean of
HI_DOM (Herfindahl Index of domestic institution)
is 13.86 percent, while the highest is 97.49 percent.
This suggests that the average of ownership con-
centration is 13.86 percent, while the highest con-
centration is 97.49 percent. If HI_DOM equal to 1
(100 percent), this means that the company owned
by one domestic institution, then 97.49 percent
means that the company owned by a small number
of the owner with a high percentage of ownership.
The mean of three firm performance’s indica-
tors, measured by operating cost to sales ratio (O/
S), sales to assets ratio (S/A), and Tobin’s Q (TQ)
are 0.98, 0.96, and 1.74 respectively. The highest
number of those variables are 21.34, 5.66, and 62.74.
The mean of TQ that more than one (1.738384) sug-
gests the market values listed company higher than
the book value (note: if the TQ= 1, this means that
the market values the company equal to book value).
Table 2 shows the stationarity test using unit
root. The non-stationarity is not accepted (*= 0) if
* estimated is statistically negative significant. The
results show that all of the t statistics of *are nega-
tive significant at 1 percent level but in the different
lag level. This suggests that all of the variables are
stationary at different lag level. The lag length of
HI_DOM, O/S, S/A, and TQ are 7, 0, 8, and 8 re-
spectively.
The lag length is how many terms back down
the Auto-Regressive process to test for serial corre-
lation or time differences. Lag length 7 means that
there are 7-time differences in the autoregressive
process in the stationarity test. While lag length 0
means that there were no time differences in Auto-
Regressive.
 HI_DOM O/S S/A TQ 
 Mean  0.138645  0.979598  0.955352  1.738384 
 Maximum  0.974959  21.35618  5.659154  62.73458 
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -9.503892 
 Std. Dev.  0.209758  1.190321  0.709783  3.312362 
 Observations  718  718  718  718 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable HI_DOM  O/S  S/A TQ 
Lag length 7 0 8 8 
t statistic of * -11.29934*** -27.76126*** -10.11631*** -8.694496*** 
Prob. of t_Statistics 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 2. Stationarity Test
Note: *** significant at 1 percent level
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Cointegration Test
Cointegration test is conducted before the test
of causality. If two series variable I(1) cointegrated,
there would be causality at least in one direction
(Granger, 1988). The result of cointegration tests
based on trace statistics is as in Table 3.
Table 4 shows that all of the three series of
trace test is significant at level 1 percent. These in-
dicate that there are two co-integrating eqn(s) at
the 0.05 level in the three series. These suggest that
there will be causality at least in one direction in
those three series.
Table 4 shows the result of pairwise Granger
causality test of 3 pairs; they are HI_DOM and O/S,
HI_DOM and S/A, and the last HI_DOM and TQ.
The results of the first pair show that there is cau-
sality between HI_DOM and O/S. The F-Statistic of
causality test for O/S does not Granger Cause
HI_DOM is 4.62284, statistically significant at 1 per-
cent level. The F-Statistic of causality test for
HI_DOM does not Granger Cause O/S is 1.81903,
statistically significant at 10 percent level. This sug-
gests that there is causality in the first pair. HI_DOM
is causing O/S, and O/S is causing HI_DOM or
ownership is causing firm performance, and firm
performance is causing ownership.
The results of the second pair show that there
is a causality between HI_DOM and S/A. The F-
Statistic of causality test for S/A does not Granger
Cause HI_DOM is 2.09835, statistically significant
at 5 percent level. The F-Statistic of causality test
for HI_ DOM does not Granger Cause S/A is 6.72722,
statistically significant at 1 percent level. This sug-
gests that there is causality in the second pair.
HI_DOM is causing S/A, and S/A is causing
HI_DOM or ownership is causing firm performance,
and firm performance is causing ownership.
The results of the third pair show that there
is causality between HI_DOM and TQ. The F-Sta-
tistic of causality test for TQ does not Granger Cause
HI_DOM is 2.26487, statistically significant at 5 per-
cent level. The F-Statistic of causality test for DOM
does not Granger Cause TQ is 3.00535 statistically
significant at 1 percent level. This suggests that there
is causality in the third pair. HI_DOM is causing TQ
and TQ is causing HI_DOM or ownership is caus-
ing firm performance, and firm performance is caus-
ing ownership.
Series Trace Statistics Hypothesized No. of CE(s) None* At most 1* 
HI_DOM and O/S 300.0011*** 129.1021*** 
HI_DOM and S/A 310.9472*** 141.6995*** 
HI_DOM and TQ 323.2386*** 137.8557*** 
 
Table 3. Cointegration test
Note: *** significant at 1 percent level
Pair Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
HI_DOM and O/S O/S does not Granger Cause HI_DOM  4.62284*** 2.E-05 
  HI_DOM does not Granger Cause O/S  1.81903* 0.0705 
HI_DOM and S/A  S/A does not Granger Cause HI_DOM  2.09835** 0.0339 
 HI_ DOM does not Granger Cause S/A  6.72022*** 2.E-08 
HI_DOM and TQ  TQ does not Granger Cause HI_DOM  2.26487** 0.0215 
  DOM does not Granger Cause TQ  3.00535*** 0.0025 
 
Table 4. Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Note: ***, **, and * are significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level respectively
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DISCUSSION
This study develops a causality model to test
whether internal mechanism of governance through
monitoring function or market for corporate con-
trol that was implemented as a corporate governance
mechanism in Indonesia or both of them. This study
will give contribution in ownership and firm per-
formance relationship based on agency problem in
the perspective of monitoring function and the mar-
ket for corporate control.
The pairwise Granger causality test of 3 pairs,
HI_DOM and O/S, HI_DOM and S/A, and the last
HI_DOM and TQ show that there were bi-causality
relationships between ownership and firm perfor-
mance. The results are consistent for firm perfor-
mance in book value (O/S and S/A) and also mar-
ket value (TQ).
The causality between ownership and firm
performance supports Khan (2011)’s argument that
corporate governance also enhances the long-term
shareholder value by the process of accountability
of managers and by enhances the firm’s perfor-
mance.
This result also consistent with Al-Haddad,
Alzurqan, & Al-Sufy (2011), Sumarno, Widjaja, &
Subandriah (2016), Andriana & Panggabean (2017),
and Mulyono, Suprapto, & Prihandoko (2018), that
support the argument that better corporate gover-
nance tends to have better performance, since there
is causality between corporate governance and firm
performance.
The causality between firm performance and
ownership support the market for corporate con-
trol argument. If the firm performance decreases,
then there is an opportunity to be taken over, and
there will be a changing in ownership.
Further study may consider more endogeneity
variables such as organizational strategy (merger,
acquisition) the type of industry, the company’s size
and its level of risk as in Cabeza-Gracia & Gómez-
Ansón (2011). The relationship between ownership
concentrations on performance is considered in a
nonlinear relationship as Villegas-Guerrero et al.
(2018) that analyzed that diûerent levels of owner-
ship concentration have on performance could be
affected by the roles performed by board members.
Then nonlinear relationship and also the role of board
members may be considered in further studies.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
The results of the study show that there is a
causality relationship between ownership and firm
performance, ownership is causing firm performance
and firm performance is causing ownership. These
suggest that both the monitoring function and the
market for corporate control were implemented as
a corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia.
These results give contribution in ownership and
firm performance relationship base on agency prob-
lem in the perspective of monitoring function and
the market for corporate control.
Suggestions
Further study may consider more endogeneity
variables in the causality model and also analyze an-
other industry to give more comprehensive results.
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